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Abstract 
 
The high vote for Brexit in England’s former industrial areas is often, reflecting historic class-
based stereotypes, presented as a result of the incapacity of the working class to act in its own 
interests. Based on ethnographic research in a former milling town and a former mining town 
in northern England, this article articulates a logic for Brexit that cross-cuts ideological 
divisions within the working class. We highlight the affective afterlives of industry and, 
drawing on the classical sociology of Ferdinand Tönnies, argue that places such as these are 
characterised by a post-industrial industrial gemeinschaft whose centrepiece is industrial work, 
and which is reinforced in the very absence of that industrial work. In turn, we argue, the 
popularity of Brexit relates significantly to that political project's potential, whether real or 
illusory, to offer a future of work, and industrial work in particular.   
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Introduction 
 
In the 2016 United Kingdom (UK) European Union (EU) membership referendum the UK 
electorate decided narrowly to leave the EU. Voting for Brexit, as departure came to be called, 
was comparatively high in England’s post-industrial areas and, thereby amongst their 
predominantly working-class electorates. Furthermore, in an historically unprecedented event, 
and in what came to be known as the Right’s penetrating of the ‘Red Wall’ several such 
electorates voted in 2019 to elect a Conservative government controlled, by and large by pro-
Leave (the EU) forces. These events reflect, in part, a well-documented growing neo-
nationalist sentiment amongst the post-industrial working class (Kalb 2011). 
 
However, in the heat of the referendum, the Brexit vote had an explicitly class antagonistic 
dimension. Working-class informants in our field sites, the town of Lyng Valley1 in West 
Yorkshire and the town of Ashington in Northumberland, articulated an uncomfortable 
awareness of the stigmatising of their Brexit sentiments in class-based terms. They reflected, 
for example, ideas about working-class racism and xenophobia. Such stigmatisation was often 
countered with reference to an alternative and apparently deeper-seated logic for the working-
 
1 ‘Lyng Valley’ is a pseudonym used due to the small size of settlements in the area and identifiability of their 
residents.  
 
Journal of Working-Class Studies Volume 5 Issue 1, June 2020 Dawson & Goodwin-Hawkins 
54 
 
class Brexit vote. Brexit was, significantly, about the issue of work, and the possibility of 
industrial work in particular. 
 
Based on anthropological fieldwork in now post-milling Lyng Valley (where Goodwin-
Hawkins has researched since 2011) and now post-mining Ashington (where Dawson has 
researched periodically since 1985), this article seeks to articulate this logic. Drawing 
significantly on affect theory and on the seminal work of Ferdinand Tönnies, whose concern 
with feelings and sentiments in many ways prefigures the affect theorists, we posit the idea of 
‘post-industrial industrial gemeinschaft’. In essence, we demonstrate how affective and other 
traces of industry outlive industry itself.  In turn, Lyng Valley and Ashington, and other places 
of their ilk, incorporate groups of people based on mutual bonds and feelings of togetherness 
that were engendered by industry and industrial work and that are reinforced rather than 
dissipated by the contemporary absences of industry and industrial work.  
 
Furthermore, and following Tönnies, we go on to argue that the mutual bonds and feelings that 
are the essence of gemeinschaft can only be sustained if their very sustenance is felt to be a 
specific goal of the group. Crucially, we argue, Brexit was a crucial moment in which those 
bonds between, and feelings amongst, the post-industrial working class were celebrated and 
experienced as actualised in a goal-orientated political project. Brexit was conceptualised, 
rightly or wrongly, as promising work and the possibility of an industrial future. To adopt the 
discourse of the affect theorists upon whose work this article partly rests, Brexit was seen to 
present a ‘future possible’ in which reality might be able to realign with people’s ‘affective 
urges’ (Berlant 2007: 278-9) that were, of course, borne of the kinds of industry that Brexit 
seemed to promise a return to. 
 
 
Industry and the making of men and women: sociality, culture and affect 
 
The story of the industrial revolution is now well rehearsed. Developments in mechanised fibre 
spinning and textile weaving initially drove Britain’s industrialisation. The tip from early 
motive technologies powered by water to engines fuelled by coal intensified the extractive 
industries. In turn, growing production, especially in the hitherto marginal North of England, 
swelled surrounding settlements, with the rise of significant manufacturing conurbations often 
associated with a single dominant industry (such as Manchester and textiles, or Sheffield and 
steel). 
 
These emerging industrial centres were filled with a new kind of labouring population – the 
working class. And, ‘industrial revolution’ came then to be conceptualised as a social, as much 
as productive process (Williams 1983). Capturing and directing this social process in interested 
ways became important. Notably, for example, the experience of industrial work was twined 
with an emerging national consciousness (Gellner 1964). Likewise, it was twinned with the 
interests of capital. As head of employer relations at Ford, the Reverend Samuel Marquis 
remarked, albeit many years later, ‘the impression has somehow got around that Henry Ford is 
in the automobile business…cars…are a by-product of his real business, which is the making 
of men’ (as cited in Grandin, 2009: 34). Also, of course, it was twinned with reactive forms of 
political consciousness (Thompson 1968) as, to use Marx’s terminology, workers transitioned 
unevenly from a klasse an sich to a klasse fur sich. 
 
The social impacts of industry were pervasive, myriad and importantly nuanced according to 
particular forms of production. Notably, a kind of industrial determinism engendered forms of 
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local identity and personhood (Edwards 2012, Muehlebach 2017) by which, for example, the 
people of Stoke-on-Trent described themselves as ‘people of the clay’ (Hart 1987) and those 
in South Yorkshire felt that ‘coal is our life’ (Dennis, Henriques & Slaughter 1956).  
 
The often very different ways in which production was organised – including specific forms of 
production process, occupational hierarchy, system of occupational mobility and, above all, 
division of labour – was pivotal in this respect. In Lyng Valley, the textile industry 
encompassed both weaving and the manufacture of ready-made clothing in ‘sewing shops’. 
Occupational hierarchies within and between the weaving sheds and sewing shops were 
carefully reckoned: weavers were at the bottom, and ‘sewers’ the next step up, themselves 
graded between ‘section workers’, who sewed just part of a garment (like a pocket or a cuff), 
and the more skilled ‘makers through’, who could complete an entire garment. Work was thus 
individuated and remunerated on a piece rate basis. Typists, who were always women, were a 
step up again, while engineering and electrical provided more prestigious forms of male 
employment. Though a worker might regularly change employer, it was rare to change 
occupation, and certainly not to cross hierarchical boundaries; a weaver, for example, would 
not re-train as a secretary, nor a sewer decamp to the weaving sheds. Indeed, young people 
came to be pointed towards their future places in the industry through a secondary school 
streaming system which explicitly separated the ‘lower class’ (future weavers) from the 
‘middle’ (future secretaries or engineers) from the ‘upper’ (future managers and professionals). 
 
As in most mining areas, in Ashington, mining was largely a domain of male employment, 
with the work underground carried out by small masculine teams. Each team had a stable 
membership, representing all the specialist roles needed for extractive work at the coal face. 
Roles were usually assigned on a new recruit’s first entry to employment, based on his 
education, connections, and sometimes even inheritance, and, as in the textile industry, 
mobility between occupations was rare. In workaday practice, each team was assigned to a 
particular part of the mine, the men working at close quarters together, and in potentially 
dangerous conditions that demanded cooperation. When work was scarce, teams competed for 
access to the mine in the ‘caval’ lottery, meaning that team members also experienced times of 
plenty and times of hardship together – conditions which extended to their families. Indeed, 
despite the male dominance in employment, mining shaped women’s lives almost as closely 
as it did men’s. When the British coal industry was nationalised in 1946, the collective 
bargaining power of the National Union of Mineworkers brought significant wage rises that 
effectively ended economic pluriactivity in Ashington; men moved out of additional 
employment into full-time mine work, and women left the waged economy for full-time 
domestic labour. 
 
These different forms of production echoed through into forms of sociality and culture that 
were, apparently secondarily removed from the workplace. For example, as we have 
demonstrated elsewhere, the individualised and collective forms of production in milling and 
mining respectively resulted in broader cultures of individualism and solidarism that frame 
even attitudes towards care (Goodwin-Hawkins and Dawson 2018) and dying (Dawson 2018a; 
Dawson and Goodwin-Hawkins 2018). In the case of milling there was a greater emphasis on 
individual responsibility, and in mining the provision of mutual aid. Later in the article we go 
on to show how this contrast has manifested ideologically too. 
 
Culturally, production affected, amongst other things, language. The dialect spoken in 
Ashington is often referred to as ‘The Pitmatic’. This reflects the way in which terminology 
deriving from the mines provides a reservoir of descriptive terms for use in everyday life. For 
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example, to emotionally wound is often described as to ‘hedgehog’. Reflecting the prickly 
animal of the same name, a hedgehog is the bundle of wires that forms when a steel winding 
cable frays, such that it can rip one’s body (and heart) apart when travelling at speed. More 
remarkably, the deafening sound of the mills engendered the practice of ‘mee-mawing’, a form 
of exaggerated speech and facial movement that facilitated easier lip-reading. Indeed, 
informants in Lyng Valley claim to be able to spot former weavers by the way they talk. And, 
lip reading endures as a skill, with the effects of industrial noise leaving many former weavers 
with hearing difficulties that have worsened with age. 
 
Aware of these kinds of slippages that take place between production and culture, Antonio 
Gramsci (1997: 302, our emphasis) remarked that industry could be described as ‘a specific 
mode of living and of thinking and feeling life.’ Famously, E.P Thomson took Gramsci’s 
insight forward, exploring the relationship between industry and feelings of temporality (1967). 
He documented how, for example, the clocks and bells of the factory were instruments that 
marked an insidious shift in daily life from the rhythms of seasonal agriculture to the measured 
time discipline of industry. Such affects, as they tend to be called these days, can be more 
positive in nature too. As, for example, Andrea Muehlebach (2017: 98) observes, the massing 
of workers on factory shop floors and in densely crowded towns created the conditions for 
collectively held values and feelings of communality. 
 
 
Industrial afterlives 
 
If the impacts of industrial production sedimented within sociality, culture and affect we are 
bound to ask to what extent was this sedimentation disrupted by post-industrialism? 
 
Britain’s de-industrialisation had earlier roots, especially in the textile industry, but was largely 
assured in the years between the 1973 oil crisis and the end of the Miners’ Strike in 1985, 
against a political shift from Keynesianism to the neoliberal forms of state economic 
management notoriously associated with Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government. At 
that point rapid privatisation and blunt economics hastened industry from its Northern 
heartlands as cheaper offshore labour costs and the increasing mobility of capital enabled 
production to be relocated abroad. Consequently, labouring lives were transformed, with a 
lucky few in Lyng Valley and Ashington relocating to the service sector and, in the case of 
Ashington, to its small light industrial sector too. More faced unemployment. And, like many 
other places in the north, Lyng Valley and Ashington also began to empty as laid-off workers 
left in search of opportunities elsewhere. 
 
All too often, and especially within our own discipline of anthropology, post-industrialisation 
is represented as entailing the ‘loss’ of community (Degnan 2012; Charles and Davies 2015; 
Pahl 2015). This is hardly surprising. The communities in question were, after all, produced in 
significant ways by industrialisation in the first place. And, more often than not, our informants 
themselves tell us that community has been lost (Dawson 2010). Camilla Lewis develops an 
interesting critique of this commonplace position (2016). Based on research in post-industrial 
Manchester (not far from Lyng Valley) she observes an oxymoronic quality within senses of 
community lost. On one hand working-class long-term residents complain incessantly about 
the loss of social ties in a formerly labouring neighbourhood now increasingly occupied by a 
new generation and new incomers. However, whilst taking residents’ complaints seriously, yet 
not at face value, Lewis asserts that complaining to each other about the lack of community 
vis-à-vis the past constitutes, is in fact the work of making community in the present. 
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The above anthropological orthodoxy and its critique both share, in fact a perspective, that loss 
of industry entails loss of community, albeit in Lewis’ case to be replaced by another kind of 
community based upon senses of the very absence of a particular type of community itself. 
However, both fail to account for the especially affective presences of industry even in post-
industrial times. These presences, or afterlives as they might more aptly be called continue to 
permeate everyday life from the most overt levels of society through to the intimacies of bodily 
experience. Notably, for example, while milling and mining only exist in the past tense, both 
Lyng Valley and Ashington continue to identify as single-industry towns: ‘trouseropolis’, and 
‘the biggest mining village in the world’ respectively. And at another end of the scale, like in 
other former industrial contexts, lung diseases are commonplace and evident in the shortness 
of breath, wheezing and hacking coughs of so many, especially older local people. Doctors can 
diagnose diseases such as pneumoconiosis or chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD).  
Yet, there is no way of knowing with certainty whether their cause was smoking, a practice 
that has been comparatively common amongst industrial working-class people, or the industrial 
smoke and particulate that formerly fogged places like Lyng Valley and Ashington. Even when 
people do not know whether it is the case, their experiences are felt and understood as outcomes 
of past industry’s continued lingering presences. Furthermore, we observe the affective 
presences of industry in post-industrial times are at play in the framing of social lives. We 
demonstrate the point by ethnographic vignette. 
 
Stan the Man  
 
When 82-year old chorister Stan Cowton stood for one last time to sing Vera Lynn’s wartime 
classic ‘We’ll meet again’ at the Ellington Miners’ Welfare Darby and Joan Club on the 
outskirts of Ashington  his labouring life was behind him, and his wife and most of his mining 
‘marras’ already dead. The song, sung in the sparrow-like warble that was all that remained of 
Stan’s still legendary ability to ‘raise the rafters’, was to mark Stan’s farewell from the club. 
After a serious heart attack had left him with a long convalescence and chronic difficulties with 
breathlessness, mobility and continence, the social services staff who organised the club 
activities had decided that he could not come back. The club, they insisted, was for the ‘active 
elderly’ only, and Stan’s care requirements were now beyond their responsibility – and 
remuneration.  
 
What the social services staff had not reckoned on was how the other club-goers would react 
to news of Stan’s exclusion. His convalescence had already left a conspicuous space at the 
dominoes table – a space soon spun into talk in reminiscences of Stan’s physical feats of labour 
at Ellington Colliery where he worked as a ‘stone man’, an especially tough and revered 
occupation that involved cutting through rock to get to the coal that ordinary hewers would 
then mine. These labouring legends of ‘Stan the Man’ were linked to reports of how he was 
getting on at home; the widows of some of his old marras regularly visited him with bottles of 
sugary Lucozade ‘to build up his strength’, and returned to the club with stories of how he was 
still tending his famously prize-winning leeks. After Stan had returned to the club to a hero’s 
welcome – and requests for a song – his fellow club-goers were not about to let him go again. 
They were dedicated to helping him ‘get out and about’ despite his infirmities, and such was 
their opposition to the organisers’ decree that they organised an on-stage performance – to 
simultaneously delight Stan and snub the organisers – in which a troupe of older women danced 
the can-can, every kick of their legs revealing the strategically and showily placed incontinence 
pads that bulged beneath their skirts. It was as if they were saying to the organisers, ‘screw 
you…physiological ageing does not make us lesser persons.’ When the discomforted 
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organisers again complained that they could not manage Stan’s care, club-goer Irene summed 
up the sentiment in the room with her incredulous reply: ‘What are you talking about? It’s us 
who do all the caring.’  
 
We linger on Stan’s story here to illustrate the afterlives of labour after labour – animate 
legacies that exceed the memorial and the material. While Stan was lionised for labouring 
deeds done decades before his quiet retirement to the dominoes table, the mining past became 
more-than-memorial in expressions of solidarity when he faced exclusion from the club for a 
body that no longer ‘worked’. The loyal bonds Stan had shared underground with his marras 
reappeared in the care and can-cans orchestrated by their wives, and in the shared insistence 
that Stan actively belonged in the colliery community – even in his inability to labour, even in 
the absence of the colliery itself.  
 
Since such forms became culturally embedded and socially reproduced, they did not 
necessarily wither alongside industry; the closure of the collieries did not end miners’ 
solidarism any more than weavers’ embodied habit of speaking exaggeratedly, ‘like this,’ was 
switched off with the last of the power looms. These ways of being and knowing have lingered 
in the lives that went on after the mills and mines had closed.  
 
 
The post-industrial industrial gemeinschaft 
 
The matter of the continued affective presences of industry in post-industrial times has become 
a focus of an especially influential genre of scholarship, the affective turn. And, by and large, 
it portrays a dystopic future of growing senses of hopelessness in places like Lyng Valley and 
Ashington. 
 
‘I want to tell a story,’ writes the cultural theorist Lauren Berlant (2007: 278-9): 
 
about post-Fordist affect as a scene of constant bargaining with normalcy in the face of 
conditions that can barely support even the memory of the fantasy [of industrial life] 
… [in which] all sorts of normative emotions stand in for affective urges for a better 
social world that leak beyond what the conventional forms deliver and stand in for.  
 
Berlant’s theorisation of ‘post-Fordist affect’ has been particularly influential in describing a 
post-industrial present in which the seeming certainties of ‘thinking and feeling life’ might be 
seen to have dissipated, along with the stable working-class employment they once affixed to. 
For Andrea Muehlebach and Nitzan Shoshan (2012: 337), for example, ‘precariousness has 
undone the experiential grounds … [and] certainties’ of an era not only predicated on industrial 
employment but on the promised futurity that came with it. In Shoshan’s (2012) own 
ethnographic account of an East Berlin neighbourhood, the presence of (in this case, state-
supported) work has given way to long, listless days in a bottle-strewn public square, where 
young unemployed men show off new trainers and trade third Reich memorabilia. For Shoshan, 
a ‘future perfect’ (2012: 44) predicated on industrial employment has transformed into a ‘past 
conditional’, in which present-day lack of opportunity is expressed as a longing for what 
‘would have been’.  
 
For sure, we see resonances with the image that Shosan paints. In Lyng Valley, the boarded-
up townscape of industry’s initial departure has been largely replaced by the neatened results 
of a municipal slum-clearance programme and the more recent arrival of boutiques and coffee 
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shops. Ashington too has been affected by similar aesthetic transformations, though less of the 
type intended to boost a tourist economy. There are nevertheless in both places ubiquitous 
marks of the precarious lives that are falling through cracks in the towns’ regenerated façades: 
young men and women standing idle and bored on street corners; the seats in the Lyng Valley 
park where young people used to gather during the day to swig cans of beer, but which have 
now been replaced by a less hospitable rose bed; parklands littered with hyperdermic needles 
for that most time-disappearing of narcotics, heroin – a commonplace local nickname for 
Ashington nowadays is ‘Ashganistan’; the euphemistic hints at overdose and suicide in local 
newspaper reports of lives ended all too young – ‘tragic family,’ ‘remembering our Karen,’ 
‘young dad’; and so on. 
 
This apparent condition of hopelessness is a central topic of conversation, especially amongst 
Lyng Valley and Ashington’s predominantly (because of outmigration) older residents. 
Unsurprisingly, in these contexts which came into existence because of industrial labour their 
focus is almost always the matter of work. Views are often ideologically polarised. We offer 
examples, one each from Lyng Valley and Ashington. 
 
Some views reflect a neoliberal emphases on the normalcy of de-industrialization, economic 
restructuring that has led to greater labour flexibility and precarity, retreat of the state from 
welfare provision and, in turn, a greater emphasis on self-reliance. The attitudes of former Lyng 
Valley textile worker Lottie McGinty are typical. She is certainly not naïve to the absence of 
the ‘real and imagined securities’ (Muehlebach & Shoshan 2012: 337) of the industrial order: 
she lived, after all, in intimate proximity to the dismantling of Lyng Valley’s textile industry. 
She watched mills close and friends and family be laid off, some of them leaving the area as 
the supposed solidities of ‘so much work’ vanished; she and her husband Clogger themselves 
circulated through multiple employers as mill work dried up, while Lottie’s brother became 
one of the well-known bricoleurs in the grey economy that grew up amid the decline. Yet, her 
views appear to be unusually harsh. Responding to reports of rising homelessness in Northern 
cities, Lottie mustered little sympathy: 
 
Well, I just don’t understand it, all this lot sat out there on the streets like that. Shocking! 
You never saw the like of it when I was younger, I tell you. Tents and all, they’ve got 
out there … Our Nella went to [larger regional town] shopping the other day, and there 
was one of them sat begging outside the bank. He’d got a dog, and he was asking folk 
for money for food for the dog. What does he want having a dog if he’s not able to feed 
it? … Our Lee’s partner, Tracey, now, she’s got some strong opinions about this. She’ll 
tell you. She says there’s work enough out there for the taking. She’s working on doing 
the training for the forklifts and the diggers, and that, see. Work enough for the taking. 
But this lot don’t seem to want to do the work for themselves … they want someone 
else to come along and fix it all up for them … As I say, when we got a house, we’d to 
work for it … No, I’ve no sympathy for them. 
 
Other views reflect an historic ‘labourism’ commonplace in places such as these. It emphasises 
the continued possibility of industry, enabled principally by nationalisation and Keynesian 
economic management such that people ought to be guaranteed work. Furthermore, it 
emphasises the necessity of adequate welfare, at least for those who are unable to work. In 
short, and in contrast to ideas of self-reliance, the emphasis is, at least where necessary, on 
state-reliance. The attitudes of George Brown, a 76-year old retired miner from Ashington, are 
typical: 
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When I walk past the food bank it makes my heart sink. I think ‘there but for the grace 
of God’. I was lucky enough to see myself through to retirement before the pits closed. 
But these young’ns, they’re reduced to charity and have had all their dignity taken away. 
It makes them a different kind of person. I don’t recognise them. They’re like foreigners 
in my own town. That’s what no work and poverty does. It’s not right. They grew-up 
expecting to work in the pits, and that was taken away from them. That’s when the 
government needs to step in, to help them, to look after them, to give them work, to 
give them a sense of purpose. But it doesn’t anymore. These poor young’ns are made 
to be nothing but beggars nowadays. It makes my heart sink. 
 
Our choice of examples reflecting self-reliance in Lyng Valley and state-reliance in Ashington 
is not coincidental. As we have argued elsewhere these are, in some respects, locally typical 
post-industrial afterlives of social ideologies forged in the individualised versus collective 
forms of production characteristic of milling and mining respectively (Dawson & Goodwin-
Hawkins 2018). Furthermore, they may be reflected in voting habits. Since 2010 Calder Valley 
(the General Electoral constituency in which Lyng Valley is a part) has consistently returned 
Members of Parliament from the Conservative Party, the British political party most closely 
associated with the idea of self-reliance. In the same period Wansbeck (the General Electoral 
constituency in which Ashington is a part) has consistently returned Members of Parliament 
from the Labour Party, the British political party most associated with ideas of state-reliance, 
welfarism and the like.  
 
Thus far, we have demonstrated how industry maintains affective presences in these post-
industrial times. However, we have been careful to temper that by recognising that different 
forms of production generate often very different social, cultural and, indeed, political forms. 
These include ideological polarisation concerning work, as described above. However, fixating 
on such ideological polarisation would miss what these accounts share, a persistent and 
overriding concern with work. Whether unemployment is seen as an outcome of individual or 
structural failing, its consequences are seen as the same. It corrodes selfhood, rendering the 
unemployed as indolent, beggars, reduced in dignity, unrecognisable, a different kind of person 
- ‘foreigners’. 
 
In one of Sociology’s seminal works, Ferdinand Tönnies distinguished between two types of 
social groupings (2002 [1912]). Gesellschaft, which is commonly translated as ‘society’, refers 
to groups that are sustained by the instrumental pursuit of aims and goals. Contrastingly, 
gemeinschaft, which is commonly translated as ‘community’, refers to groupings based on 
mutual bonds and feelings of togetherness. The affective presences of industry manifested in 
post-industrial times produces, we would argue, gemeinschaft, or to be more specific post-
industrial industrial gemeinschaft. And, this is, we would contend further, reinforced by the 
very absence of industry. As evidenced by an overriding and ‘shared’ concern with work, it 
might also be characterised as a post-industrial labour labouring gemeinschaft that, likewise, 
strengthens in the very absence of labour. 
 
 
Brexit – a future possible 
 
For Tönnies the mutual bonds that are the essence of gemeinschaft can only be sustained if 
their very sustenance is felt to be a specific goal of the group. Moments of such goal-orientation 
are just that, momentary. Crucially, we go on to argue here that Brexit was one such crucial 
moment, when senses of a post-industrial industrial gemeinschaft came to the fore, and when 
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Brexit itself appeared to be a political project that offered the possibility of gemeinschaft in 
general, a hope for the survival of embattled post-industrial communities. Adopting the 
language of the affect theorists, Brexit promised transformation from the experiences of the 
past conditional to, if not quite a future perfect (Shoshan 2012: 44) then at least a ‘future 
possible’. 
 
‘Brexit’, as we all surely now know, refers to the moment when the UK’s population voted in 
a referendum in 2016 to exit the European Union (EU). Brexit constitutes arguably the most 
significant political transformation in post-World War II Britain. Importantly, the post-
industrial working class was a key agent in the Brexit vote, and its vote represented a 
crystallisation of that class’ developing attachment to neo-nationalism in general through the 
2000s (Kalb 2011). Ashington and Lyng Valley are illustrative. 
 
In England neo-nationalism’s most marked early manifestation was certainly the rise of The 
United Kingdom Independence Party (Ukip), a political party whose core policy was 
withdrawal of the UK from the EU. Ukip’s support rose dramatically from 390 thousand votes 
(1.2% of the electorate that voted) at the first General Election it contested in 2001 through to 
3.8 million (12.6%) in 2015. In 2015 the Ukip vote in Calder Valley was 11.1% and, in 
considerable excess of the average national Ukip vote it was fully 18.2% in Wansbeck. The 
difference between Calder Valley and Wansbeck may, at least in part, be put down to the fact 
that the Conservative Party, which has been the leading political party in Calder Valley 
throughout the 2000s, was more receptive to Ukip’s core agenda. Notably, the Conservatives 
campaigned in the 2015 General Election on the promise of a referendum on EU membership. 
In the event the Conservative Party won the 2015 General Election and delivered the 
referendum in 2016. The national result in the referendum was ‘Leave’ 51.9% and ‘Remain’ 
48.1%. Echoing a pattern in other parts of post-industrial Britain, in Northumberland (the 
European electoral region encompassing Ashington) the Brexit vote was 54.1% and in 
Calderdale (the European electoral region encompassing Lyng Valley) it was 55.7%. 
 
Perceived largely as a one issue party whose purpose had been fulfilled by Brexit, the vote for 
Ukip collapsed in the 2017 General Election to a mere 3.5% of the voting electorate nationally. 
Responding to a general trend and, opportunistically to Ukip’s electoral vulnerability, the UK’s 
mainstream political parties accommodated increasingly, to a greater degree in the case of the 
Conservative Party (Dawson 2017) and lesser degree in the case of the Labour Party (Leddy-
Own 2014), to neo-nationalist sentiment. However, in general the rise of neo-nationalism and 
the Brexit vote in particular left both parties fractured for a time, between remainers, leavers, 
‘deal’ and ‘no deal’ leavers, and a multiplicity of deal leavers who, nonetheless, differed on the 
specific conditions under which the UK should leave the EU. The fracture was marked in the 
Conservative Party, with the majority of party members rallying, sometimes very reluctantly, 
around a new ‘Hard Brexit’2 leadership that came to power in 2019 shortly before the exit 
agreement from the EU was concluded, but a significant minority supporting either ‘Soft 
Brexit’3 or Remain also. The fracture was even more marked in the Labour Party, with the 
majority of party members supporting Remain, but, and crucially for our purposes, a significant 
minority of Members of Parliament from largely northern post-industrial contexts responding 
to local preferences and standing askance from the mainstream by supporting Brexit in 
whatever form. Not coincidentally for example, the Member of Parliament for Wansbeck, 
where Ashington is located is, arguably the leading light in this movement. 
 
2 A form of Brexit in which Britain remains closely aligned with the EU.  
3 A form of Brexit that rejects close alignment with the EU. 
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Political Scientist Michael Kenny observes perceptively that the sentiments underlying Brexit, 
‘emerged in far more varied forms than is typically imagined’ (2016: 1). We argue that in post-
industrial contexts such as Ashington and Lyng Valley the most significant sentiment 
underlying Brexit is the aforementioned concern with work. Beyond these contexts themselves 
this tends to be recognised only obliquely, especially in a commonplace narrative that sees 
Brexit as a response to globalisation (e.g. Diamond 2018). However, before developing our 
thesis on the relationship between Brexit and work, it is important to assess critically how 
people in post-industrial communities, especially their majority working-classes, are typically 
imagined to typically imagine the logics of Brexit. For it is against that background that the 
views of people on Brexit in places like Ashington and Lyng Valley are constructed. 
 
As a key agent of Brexit, the post-industrial working class came to be a focus of significant 
scapegoating for the unexpected Brexit result in the years that followed it. The process is 
illustrated graphically by the banner (which came to be infamous) carried by an obviously 
middle-class protester at a ‘Remain – keep Britain in Europe’ rally. It read, ‘HELP! We’re 
trapped on an island that’s been taken by MAD PEOPLE!’ Though largely inchoate in 
statements such as these, scapegoating of the post-industrial working class in relation to Brexit 
resonates with historic and stigmatising tropes deployed by the middle classes (McKenzie 
2013). We consider three such tropes to be of particular salience in relation to Brexit. 
 
Firstly, the post-industrial working-class, and its ‘Brexiters’ (Brexit supporters) in particular, 
is commonly stereotyped as racist and xenophobic. The early Twenty-First Century brought 
significant changes to the immigration profile of many of the UK’s post-industrial contexts. Of 
greatest impact were the National Dispersal Program that re-settled forced migrants in mostly 
post-industrial areas (Dawson 2002), and the large influx of immigrants wrought by EU 
expansion in 2004. For example, between 2004-8 roughly 1.5 million people arrived from the 
new member states (UK Border Agency 2008). At first blush these circumstances may appear 
to be solid grounds for the emergence of racism. Indeed, the anthropological record documents 
significant instances of racist hostility (e.g. Evans 2006; Grill 2012). However, its greater part 
documents practices of immigrant accommodation (e.g. Rhodes 2012; Watt 2006). Notably, 
studies document how working class people in many post-industrial contexts incorporate 
immigrants within their communities (Edwards 2000; Fortier 2007; Watt 2006; Rhodes 2012; 
Tyler 2015), and, as a result how new working class cosmopolitanisms have emerged (Werbner 
2006; Wise & Velayutham 2009).  
 
Secondly, the post-industrial working class, and its Brexiters in particular, is commonly 
stereotyped as being characterised by a resurgent Englishness in the sense of growing sentiment 
for English culture and tradition (e.g. Eichhorn 2018). There are grounds for this, especially in 
the much observed ‘English indigeneity’ (Evans 2012) that emerged in response to immigration 
and labourist multiculturalism (see below). The idea of English indigeneity has been deployed 
tactically by far-right groups such as the English Defence League (EDL) who ingeniously turn 
post-colonial politics on its head (Kuper 2003) and re-represent immigration and 
multiculturalism as forms of ethnic cleansing that presage genocide of the ‘native’ English. 
Ukip was, however, more successful in terms of garnering support for an anti-immigration 
agenda by casting it less in terms of the overtly racist (and paranoid) rhetoric of fringe groups 
such as the EDL, and more in terms of concerns about the unrestrained free-movement of 
people wrought by an increasingly ‘borderless’ Europe. Nonetheless, like the EDL, for Ukip, 
‘Englishness is an important pivot around which key elements of the party’s appeal revolve’ 
(Hayton 2016: 400). 
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Having said all this, as several observers have pointed out (e.g. Kenny 2016), resurgent 
Englishness is a much-exaggerated phenomenon based on a series of inappropriate 
assumptions. For example, Englishness is not an inevitable dialectical outcome of either the 
presence of a greater number of non-English people or resurgent Welsh and, particularly 
Scottish nationalisms. Likewise, Ukip’s and the Vote Leave campaign’s widespread use of 
symbols of English culture and tradition should not be confused, as it so often is, with an 
attachment to said culture and tradition by the ordinary people who supported them (Kenny 
2016). To illustrate, way back in 1996 flying that most emblematic symbol of Englishness, the 
flag of St. George became commonplace in the Northeast. The practice was propelled amongst 
other things4 by the success of the England football team in the European football 
championships of that year. Crucially, the team’s success was based largely on the 
extraordinary performance of Paul Gascoigne, a player from Tyne & Wear5, which is 
considered locally in places like Ashington to be England’s ‘cradle’ of football. At the time 
one football-crazy Ashington informant of Dawson’s explained the St. George flag flying 
above his pigeon ‘cree’ thus: ‘That’s all about Geordie pride bonny lad,’ i.e. not England. 
Twenty-two years later the England team of 2018 surpassed the exploits of their 1996 
counterparts, this time making it to the World Cup semi-finals, and again largely on the back 
of outstanding performances by Tyne & Wear born men – goalkeeper Jordan Pickford and 
captain Jordan Henderson. This time, in the midst of the Brexit crisis the same informant was 
even more careful to leave no room for misunderstanding. Speaking of his now tattered St. 
George flag he stated: ‘I am all for Brexit. But that […pointing at the flag] has got nowt to do 
with it. England’s for them fucking Cockneys6. My flag’s all about Geordie pride bonny lad.’ 
It would seem that regional (and especially their material) manifestations of Englishness can, 
and often are, oxymoronically anti-English in certain respects. 
 
Thirdly, the post-industrial working class, and its Brexiters in particular, is commonly 
stereotyped as being characterised as hanging on to misplaced senses of entitlement, both in 
terms of livelihood and polity. Key symbols of this are, respectively, the welfarism and 
corporatism (in which unions were partners with government and industry in policy-making 
and power more generally) of the post-World War II era, an era in which Labour – the party of 
the working-class - was viewed widely as the ‘natural party of government’. The most 
apocryphal and commonplace illustration of this alleged sense of political entitlement is the 
‘demarcation dispute’, where, it is claimed, for example, it took three men to bring light – one 
to erect the ladder, one to fit the bulb, and one to flick the switch – and three unions to ensure 
that no one worker usurped another’s role. In fact, and as many of our working class informants 
testify, those days are widely viewed as having long gone, if even they existed. They are acutely 
aware of livelihood disenfranchisement wrought by the roll back of the welfare state and new 
and precarious neoliberal employment practices, and the representation of many of ‘their own’ 
as contemporary folk devils (Cohen 1972) - ‘welfare scroungers’ and the like. Likewise, they 
are acutely aware of their political disenfranchisement (see also Bottero 2009; Rhodes 2011; 
Rhodes 2012; Edwards et al. 2012; Evans 2012; Smith 2012). That process was instigated and 
cultivated through nineteen years of neoliberal Conservative government following the 
election of the Thatcher administration in 1979. Its effects included, crucially the weakening 
of unionism, the symbolic centrepiece of which was the defeat of the National Union of 
 
4 Such as ‘Cool Britannia’, a period of increased pride in the UK, and especially English culture that was 
inspired largely by pop culture and the success of bands such as Blur and Oasis. 
5 A metropolitan county in the north east of England around the mouths of the rivers Tyne and Wear. 
6 A term generally used to refer to people from London’s East End, though commonly used by many northern 
people to refer pejoratively to all people from southern England.  
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Mineworkers in its year-long strike of 1984-85. However, arguably, the most significant 
moment in working-class political disenfranchisement was, paradoxically, the Labour Party 
victory of 1997. The party rebranded itself as ‘New Labour’. ‘New’ referred, in part to the 
party’s ‘Third Way’ politics. In essence, and in what turned out to be a successful attempt to 
capture the electoral centre-ground, the Third Way’s core injunction was prosperity through 
merit rather than class entitlement. Simultaneously, and in the context of a country that was 
becoming increasingly ethnically diverse through immigration, New Labour also very 
explicitly embraced multiculturalism. In short, New Labour abandoned ‘Old Labour’s’ historic 
partisanship for the, predominantly white, industrial working class. 
 
The veracity of each of these tropes – of working class racism, Englishness and entitlement – 
is clearly questionable. Nonetheless, we observe, in the Brexit milieu they were re-animated 
and undergirded by another historic and, in its case, master trope – of what has been described 
elsewhere as ‘povertyism’ (e.g. Shildrick et al 2012), whereby the working-class is presented 
as lacking the requisite knowledge to be able to act in its own interest. In terms of this master 
trope the working class vote for Brexit was, as one middle class resident of Lyng Valley put it, 
a ‘wrong vote based on wrong knowing’. 
 
On matters of immigration, the views of Lyng Valley informant Jos Blackshaw are typical. Jos 
was born and raised in Lyng Valley, but spent his working life in a Northern city, climbing the 
corporate ladder. A recent conversation with a former schoolfriend, who had stayed on in the 
area, turned to Brexit. Jos had voted to remain; his friend revealed that she had voted to leave. 
Jos scathingly recounted:  
 
Half her problem is that she just doesn’t like to see brown faces. That’s the immigration 
they’re on about, this lot who say they want curbs on immigration. Well, it only shows 
how little they know about the EU, because that’s not the immigration coming out is 
going to stop. … She said to me, oh, see, you know about these things because of your 
education. Please! She wants to educate herself, and I told her that. It’s complete – 
excuse me – cluelessness, and all this mithering7 about some lost golden age that never 
actually happened … it’s people like that who’ve landed us now in a right mess.  
 
Jos characterises a racist working class that voted to leave because, ignorantly and counter-
instrumentally (at least in terms of the stereotype of working class racism) its members thought 
that would prevent the immigration of black people when, in fact, the main effect would be to 
halt the immigration of, largely white Europeans. On matters of entitlement and 
disenfranchisement the views of former Ashington school headmaster John Wise are 
illustrative and typical too. John devotes much of life in retirement to the ‘good work’ of 
dispensing nourishment to the poor from one of the town’s several food banks. His 
bewilderment at the Brexit sympathies of many of his clients knows no boundaries: 
 
 Half the folk around here need caring for. They cannot fend for themselves, 
and they cannot even think straight. Half of them are still saying, ‘It’ll be 
alright when Brexit happens’. They can’t see that it’ll be so much worse. 
See […pointing to his copy of The Guardian], even according to the modest 
estimates of the Civil Service over fifteen years GDP will contract by at least 
3.9%. In the case of a no deal Brexit it’ll be 9.3% (HM Government 2018). 
9.3%! Do you hear that? Do they know what that means? It’s devastation. And, 
 
7
 Fussing or moaning. 
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as it says here, the poorer you are the greater the negative effect (Ipsos MORI 2016). 
 
And, John went on: 
 
What they don’t see is that with Brexit they’re swapping Europe for Trump. Give me 
Europe any day of the week, but this lot need[s] it even more than the likes of me. 
Without the protections of the EU they can look forward to the end of welfare, the free 
market running riot and the end of all the economic benefits that being in Europe gives 
them. For goodness sake, many of them don’t even see the irony. There’s a great big 
plaque on the door of the place where they collect their free lunches. It says, ‘provided 
by European Union funds’. Really. They’re cutting their noses to spite their faces. God 
bless the misguided. 
 
During the referendum the most effective campaigning slogan was undoubtedly the Brexiteers’ 
(campaigners for Brexit) ‘Taking Back Control’. It seemed to speak to issues of sovereignty, 
of re-controlling the borders in order to halt immigration and the demise of Englishness, and 
replacing increasingly Europeanised institutions in order to reverse processes of 
disenfranchisement. Reflecting the master trope of ignorance and inability to act in one’s own 
interest, views such as those articulated above present, instead working-class Brexiters as a 
people who, as John Wise went on to put it succinctly, ‘aren’t taking back control. They’re 
giving it away.’ 
 
The trope of ignorance and inability to act in one’s own interest – of  ‘cluelessness’, of being 
‘misguided’, and of needing ‘caring for’ – articulated by many middle class people was 
commonplace too within Remain-supporting media and several political parties, especially The 
Liberal Democratic Party. In continuing to campaign for Remain it gave scant respect for the 
Brexit majority and, indeed, dismissed it with confrontational slogans: most infamously 
‘Bollocks to Brexit’. And, perhaps it paid the price for this when it failed miserably in the 
General Election of 2019, when even its own leader was not re-elected. The sense of 
entitlement to do this, and, indeed, the trope of the working class’ ignorance and inability to 
act in its own interest generally may, we would argue, come from a deep English tradition of 
upper and middle class paternalism (Thompson 1978). Importantly however, contemporary 
paternalism in the context of Brexit may be counterproductive. As E. P. Thompson observed 
long ago, paternalism serves to heighten class tensions and polarise classes in relation to issues 
that they may otherwise agree upon, were it not for the offensive and patronising articulation 
of that paternalism (1978). Perhaps this is one reason why, in the face of damning assessments 
of its likely impacts, support for Brexit amongst working class people remained remarkably 
resolute (YouGov 2019). Furthermore, contemporary paternalism in the context of Brexit is 
certainly hypocritical. As Gary Younge points out, voting against one’s apparent self-interest, 
as large sections of the liberal middle classes frequently do by selecting (usually out of good 
conscience) high taxing governments that will erode their incomes more than others, is not 
solely the preserve of the working class (2019). Given this, and in the classic anthropological 
tradition (Evans-Pritchard 1976 [1937]) our task ought to be, then not to patronise and critique 
but, instead to uncover the logics operated by members of the post-industrial working class in 
voting for Brexit in the context of their knowing that in many ways it may cut against many of 
their interests. In other words, our task ought to be to understand why, as one man from Crewe 
– the now run down centre for maintenance of Britain’s locomotives (that most iconic form of 
transport in the industrial era) – described Brexit, ‘it is terrible, but I still want it’ (Pidd 2019). 
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In her study of a former coal-mining town in South Yorkshire Catherine Thorleiffson highlights 
as both typical and key in terms of explaining support for Brexit the comments of an informant 
(2016). He states, ‘people don’t realize that in our community, mining was all they (sic) ever 
known and done’ (2016: 560). Thorleiffson sees in such statements an expression of 
helplessness and, thereby, Brexit as a protest vote. In contrast, we see the expression of a kind 
of hope, specifically that Brexit may afford a future of work, the very thing that brought the 
formerly industrial places where these people live into being and, thus, the very thing that, as 
mining and milling people imply and, as we state, continues to define who they are today. Such 
hope may be misguided, but it is certainly not, à la the povertyist trope based on a lack of 
knowing. Indeed, commonly articulated work-related logics for Brexit are often complex and, 
dare we say it in the face of the povertyist trope, remarkably sophisticated. These logics also 
often confound other key stereotypes of the Brexit voting post-industrial working class. By 
way of illustration we offer two here. 
 
Firstly, in the context of matters of disenfranchisement the meaningfulness of the Brexit maxim 
‘Taking Back Control’ was, we observe, rarely a nostalgia for lost welfare or corporatism. 
Rather, it was an expression of hope that Brexit might presage an escape from EU adherence 
to international conventions – such as the Kyoto Protocols – and the free trade Eurozone that 
appear to stand in the way of the reinvigoration of, especially extractive, industries and, hence 
work. 
 
Secondly, in the context of immigration the meaningfulness of the Brexit maxim ‘Taking Back 
Control’ was, we observe, rarely an expression of racism. Access to an international labour 
force that EU membership affords is, quite reasonably seen as having militated against local 
people’s ability to find work now. Furthermore, and congruent with the logics of ‘Austerity’8, 
it is seen as undergirding cut-backs in training, retraining and the development of local human 
capital more generally, such that the inability of many local people to find work now will 
continue into the future. As one informant explained to Dawson his apparently paradoxical 
support for the immigration controls promised by Brexit whilst bestowing the virtues of his 
Polish neighbours: ‘there’s nothing hard to understand about it. It’s just a case of hating 
immigration and loving immigrants (2018b: 7).’  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This comparative ethnography of post-industrial northern England began by outlining the 
impacts, historically of industry on sociality, culture and affect, and how these differ according 
to particular kinds of industry. In particular, we highlighted individualism in milling and 
solidarism in mining. Then, we took issue with a common assumption, especially within 
anthropological literature: that de-industrialisation disrupted industrial socialities, cultures and 
affects to such an extent that the communities upon which they were founded are now ‘lost’. 
 
In contrast, we illustrate ethnographically the continuity of industry’s presences, especially at 
the level of affect, and how these affective presences, or ‘industrial afterlives’ continue to frame 
social action and community. Drawing on the seminal work of Ferdinand Tönnies, we describe 
this as ‘post-industrial industrial gemeinschaft’, a grouping of people based on mutual bonds 
and feelings of togetherness that, in this case were engendered by industry and are reinforced 
 
8 The reduction of government budget deficits through spending cuts and/or tax increases. 
 
Journal of Working-Class Studies Volume 5 Issue 1, June 2020 Dawson & Goodwin-Hawkins 
67 
 
rather than dissipated by the very absence of industry. The core of those bonds in towns like 
Lyng Valley and Ashington, which came into being because of industry is, inevitably work. 
Indeed, we demonstrate, concern about work transcends even deep political schisms between 
attachment to neoliberal-like and labourist ideologies that have emerged, in part from the 
contrasting individuated and collectivised forms of production and work in these contexts.  
 
In the tone set by influential cultural theorist Lauren Berlant (2007), contemporary work on 
post-industrial affect tends to theorise de-industrialisation alongside industry’s continued 
affective presences generating such social groups in ways that are, however characterised by 
senses and experiences of hopelessness. Where once Marxian theorists spoke of the mutuality 
of the oppressed (Dawson 1998), affect theorists tend to depict a mutuality of the post-
industrial depressed. This elides with some of our observations, but not all of them! And, it is 
in this sense too that we see particular value in the notion gemeinschaft. As we have stated, for 
Tönnies the mutual bonds and feelings that are the essence of gemeinschaft can only be 
sustained if their very sustenance is felt to be a specific goal of the group.  
 
Moments of such goal-orientation are just that, momentary. We have argued that Brexit was 
one such crucial moment. Its central slogan ‘Taking Back Control’ was, to adopt the 
anthropological parlance, multivocal (Cohen 1985). Yes, for some working class people no 
doubt, it spoke of Brexit addressing their racist sentiments, English patriotism and senses of 
entitlement. However, we demonstrate, through reference to both ethnographic and secondary 
material, these dispositions do not apply to many other working class people in England’s 
northern post-industrial hinterlands. They are, more often than not manifestations of deep-
seated middle class stereotypes about the working class that came to the surface in the political 
cauldron of Brexit. For the members of the post-industrial working class to whom we refer 
Brexit brought another kind of hope – for , if not quite a ‘future perfect’ (Shoshan 2012: 337) 
then, at least, a future possible in which reality might be able to realign with people’s ‘affective 
urges’ (Berlant 2007: 278-9) that were borne of industry. In short, in Brexit the post-industrial 
working class saw, above all, a glimmer of hope for a world of work and, hence a return to 
senses of normality and their reason for being. 
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